However, people who are more a-insensitive (insufficient discrimination between different likelihood levels) are less likely to act upon their beliefs. People who are more ambiguity averse decide to trust less, and people with more optimistic beliefs about others’ trustworthiness decide to trust more. People’s ambiguity attitudes and beliefs both matter for their trust decisions. We extend this method to strategic situations and apply it to the trust game, providing new insights. (Econometrica, 2018b) introduced a method that allows for such a separation for individual choice. Despite many theoretical studies on ambiguity in game theory, empirical studies have lagged behind due to a lack of measurement methods, where separating ambiguity attitudes from beliefs is crucial. We provide a number of examples illustrating the usefulness of the framework, including novel results for a purely ordinal matching game that satisfies all of our assumptions and for games for which the preferences of the players admit representations from a wide class of decision-theoretic models.ĭecisions to trust in strategic situations involve ambiguity (unknown probabilities).
The work eschews any notion of objective randomization, convexity, monotonicity, or independence of beliefs. Savage games provide a tractable framework for studying attitudes toward uncertainty in a strategic setting. In the class of games we consider, player preferences satisfy versions of Savage's sure-thing principle and small event continuity postulate. Players' information and subjective attitudes toward uncertainty are encoded in the state-dependent preferences over state contingent action profiles. However, Savage games are free of priors, probabilities, and payoffs.
Every Bayesian game is ordinally equivalent to a Savage game. Savage's framework of purely subjective uncertainty. We define and discuss Savage games, which are ordinal games of incomplete information set in L.
0 kommentar(er)
